

EMERGENCY SUMMIT OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

ESIW

Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco • September 1969



“And hold firmly to the rope of Allah, all together, and do not become divided.”

— Sūrah Āl ‘Imrān, 3:103

OFFICIAL BACKGROUND GUIDE

Table of Contents

1. Introduction to the Committee3

- 1.1 Committee Structure & Expectations3

2. Historical Background3

- 2.1 The Idea of Muslim Unity Before 19693
- 2.2 The Age of Decolonization (1945–1969)4
- 2.3 The Arab Cold War4
- 2.4 The Question of Palestine and the Six-Day War5
- 2.5 The Spark: The Burning of Al-Aqsa, 21 August 19695
- 2.6 The Road to This Summit6

3. Committee Mandate6

4. Delegation Roster6

5. Pathways to Unity: Models the Ummah Has Already Built7

- 5.1 The Arab League (est. 1945)7
- 5.2 The Non-Aligned Movement (est. 1961)8
- 5.3 The Organisation of African Unity (est. 1963)8
- 5.4 The Baghdad Pact and CENTO: A Cautionary Tale8
- 5.5 The Muslim World League (est. 1962)8

6. Case Study: A Continental Experiment in the West8

- 6.1 Origins: Pooling the Instruments of War9
- 6.2 The Common Market Pillar9
- 6.3 The Monetary Pillar: A Single Shared Currency10
- 6.4 The Security Pillar: A Joint Shield and a Joint Army10
- 6.5 The Political & Legal Pillars11
- 6.6 Financing the Whole Structure12
- 6.7 Free Movement, a Common Passport, and a Shared Identity12
- 6.8 A Common External Voice13
- 6.9 Admission of New Members13
- 6.10 Questions for This Summit to Weigh13

7. Key Questions for Delegates (QARMAs)14

8. Closing Note & Further Preparation15

1. Introduction to the Committee

The Emergency Summit of the Islamic World (ESIW) is a historical hybrid committee: part crisis body, responding to unfolding events via directives and communiqués, and part classic body, tasked with the deliberate, longer-horizon work of drafting a founding framework for cooperation among Muslim-majority states. Delegates will operate on two clocks at once. The first is the clock of the crisis — breaking updates from the Executive Board, regional flashpoints, and the reactions of external powers (the two Cold War blocs, the United Nations, and neighbouring regional organisations) that may accelerate or derail the Summit's work. The second is the slower clock of institution-building: designing charters, funds, courts, and councils that could function for decades.

Both clocks point toward the same underlying question. In August 1969, an arson attack gutted a wing of al-Masjid al-Aqsa in Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam, under Israeli administration since the 1967 war. The attack detonated a wave of outrage across the Muslim world and forced a question that had circulated in salons, newspapers, and royal courts for over a decade into the centre of state business: should the Islamic world formalise itself — not merely as a shared faith or a loose sentiment of brotherhood, but as a standing political structure, with permanent institutions, a permanent address, and a permanent voice?

This guide does not tell you what that structure should look like. It gives you the raw material — the history that brought you to this room, the biographies of the men sitting around the table with you, the existing organisations the ummah has already built (and their limits), and one detailed case study of a very different, very ambitious experiment in political and economic union taking shape on the far side of the Mediterranean, which your leaders will certainly have read about in their own intelligence briefings. What you build from these materials is yours to decide.

1.1 Committee Structure & Expectations

- Delegates represent heads of state or senior heads of government, and should write, negotiate, and speak with the authority and constraints those offices carry.
- Directives may be used to respond to crisis updates from the dais; draft resolutions (here termed Communiqués or Charters) are used for the Summit's long-term institutional output.
- Portfolio powers are in play — each delegation controls real assets relevant to their state in 1969 (oil revenue, military capacity, religious authority, diplomatic relationships with the superpowers) and may deploy them creatively.
- Consensus is prized in Islamic diplomatic tradition (**shura**, or consultation, is a recurring theme delegates may wish to invoke) but is not mandatory — blocs may and should compete for influence over the Summit's final shape.

2. Historical Background

2.1 The Idea of Muslim Unity Before 1969

The dream of a unified Muslim political community is as old as the faith's early caliphates, but the modern version of the idea — pan-Islamism as a response to European domination — crystallised in the late

nineteenth century. Thinkers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani argued that the Muslim world's fragmentation, not any inherent weakness, explained its subjugation by European empires, and called for solidarity across the Ottoman, Persian, and South Asian Muslim worlds against colonial encroachment. The Ottoman Sultan-Caliphs, especially Abdulhamid II, attempted to harness this sentiment as a tool of state policy, positioning Istanbul as the spiritual centre of a global Muslim community even as the empire itself weakened.

The abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 by the new Turkish Republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk removed the last institution that had, however imperfectly, claimed to speak for Sunni Muslims as a political bloc. The interwar decades saw various Caliphate Congresses (Cairo, 1926; Mecca, 1926) attempt and fail to agree on a successor institution or a successor caliph. Pan-Islamism receded as a state project and survived mainly as an intellectual and social movement — the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, and Jamaat-e-Islami, founded in British India in 1941, both being products of this current, more focused on society and law than on interstate diplomacy.

The first real institutional green shoot came only in 1962, when Saudi Arabia convened the founding conference of the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami) in Mecca. The League was explicitly religious and charitable in mandate — coordinating Hajj logistics, funding mosques and Islamic education abroad, and countering the secular Arab nationalism then radiating from Cairo — rather than a vehicle for binding political or military cooperation between governments. It proved that pan-Islamic institution-building was possible. It did not prove that Muslim states could bind themselves to one another the way a political or military alliance would require.

2.2 The Age of Decolonization (1945–1969)

Nearly every delegation at this Summit leads a state that did not exist, or was not sovereign, twenty-five years earlier. Between the end of the Second World War and 1969, the map of the Muslim world was almost entirely redrawn: Pakistan (1947), Indonesia (1945/1949), Libya (1951), Sudan (1956), Tunisia and Morocco (1956), Malaysia (1957/1963), Guinea (1958), Mauritania and Niger and Mali (1960), Algeria (1962, after a brutal eight-year war against France), Kuwait (1961), and the Trucial States and Bahrain and Qatar (still moving toward independence as this Summit convenes, following Britain's 1968 announcement that it would withdraw from 'East of Suez' by 1971).

This shared experience of decolonization is the strongest adhesive available to this Summit. Nearly every leader in the room built their legitimacy, in whole or in part, on the story of throwing off a European empire. The 1955 Bandung Conference, which brought together twenty-nine Asian and African states (including Egypt, Indonesia, and Iran) around the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and anti-colonial solidarity, and the 1961 founding of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade, both demonstrated that postcolonial states could organise around shared grievance and shared caution toward both Cold War blocs. Whether that same organising energy can be narrowed and deepened around a specifically Islamic identity — rather than a broader postcolonial or African or Asian one — is very much an open question for this committee.

2.3 The Arab Cold War

Delegates from Arab states arrive at this Summit in the middle of what historians will later call the Arab Cold War: a struggle, running roughly from the late 1950s through 1970, between revolutionary Arab republics — Nasser's Egypt foremost among them, joined by Ba'athist Syria and Iraq, Gaddafi's new Libya, and Boumédiène's Algeria — and conservative Arab monarchies, led by Saudi Arabia and joined by Jordan and the Gulf sheikhdoms. The republics championed pan-Arab socialism, often hostile to traditional monarchy and to what they characterised as reactionary alignment with Western oil interests. The monarchies championed Islamic legitimacy, gradualism, and wary cooperation with the West as a bulwark against both Israel and Soviet-aligned radicalism.

This rivalry was not academic. From 1962 to 1970 it produced a real proxy war in Yemen, where Egyptian troops backed republican forces against Saudi-backed royalists — a costly, grinding conflict often called 'Egypt's Vietnam,' which drained Cairo's military and prestige. King Faisal's 1966 proposal for an 'Islamic Pact' uniting Muslim monarchies against Nasserist republicanism was, in no small part, a Cold-War-within-the-Cold-War maneuver, and Nasser denounced it bitterly as a reactionary, American-aligned bloc dressed in religious clothing. Any pan-Islamic institution proposed at this Summit will be read, by every delegation, through this lens: does it strengthen the monarchies at the republics' expense, or vice versa? Can a truly neutral vehicle even be built?

2.4 The Question of Palestine and the Six-Day War

No grievance unites this room more consistently than Palestine. The 1948 war that accompanied Israel's founding displaced hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs, a catastrophe (the Nakba) that remains a live political wound for every Arab government. The Palestine Liberation Organisation, founded in Cairo in 1964 under Arab League sponsorship, gave the Palestinian national movement a formal institutional voice, now led by Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction, which took control of the PLO's leadership earlier this year.

The June 1967 Six-Day War transformed the conflict's scale. In six days, Israel defeated the combined armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, seizing the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza from Egypt, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem and the Old City, home to al-Aqsa) from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The defeat was a political earthquake: it discredited the secular Arab nationalist model that Nasser had championed, radicalised a new generation of Palestinian fighters who concluded that Arab state armies could not liberate their homeland for them, and left Jerusalem — and its holy sites — under non-Muslim sovereign control for the first time since the Crusades. UN Security Council Resolution 242, passed in November 1967, called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in exchange for peace, a formula every state in this room formally endorses and privately argues about endlessly.

2.5 The Spark: The Burning of Al-Aqsa, 21 August 1969

On 21 August 1969, a fire broke out inside al-Masjid al-Aqsa, severely damaging the historic Salah ad-Din pulpit (Saladin's minbar, installed in the twelfth century to commemorate the recapture of Jerusalem from the Crusaders) and threatening the mosque's southern wing. The man responsible, an Australian national with extremist Christian millenarian beliefs, was arrested within days and was found, by Israeli authorities, to have acted without state direction or a wider conspiracy. That finding did little to calm the reaction across the Muslim world.

For governments that had spent two years absorbing the political humiliation of the Six-Day War, the fire read as confirmation of a deeper danger: that the holy places of Islam, under non-Muslim administration, could never be considered secure, and that the fragmented, uncoordinated Muslim world had no mechanism — diplomatic, religious, or military — to respond collectively to a shared crisis. Protests, strikes, and statements of outrage poured in from Rabat to Jakarta within days. Even governments that agreed on almost nothing else — revolutionary Libya and monarchical Saudi Arabia, socialist Algeria and conservative Kuwait — found themselves saying the same thing: something must be built.

2.6 The Road to This Summit

In the weeks following the fire, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and King Hassan II of Morocco moved quickly and in tandem, using their personal networks (Faisal's religious authority as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, Hassan's standing as chairman of the Arab League's Jerusalem Committee) to convene an emergency summit of Muslim heads of state and government in Rabat. Invitations went out across ideological lines — to revolutionary republics as readily as to fellow monarchies — on the theory that the al-Aqsa fire was a wound to the whole ummah, not to any single bloc within it.

3. Committee Mandate

The Executive Board charges this Summit with two tasks, to be pursued simultaneously:

- Respond, as a crisis body, to the unfolding diplomatic and security situation surrounding the al-Aqsa fire and its regional aftershocks, through directives and coordinated state action.
- Deliberate, as a founding convention, on whether — and in what form — the Muslim-majority states of the world should establish a permanent, standing organisation for political, economic, religious, and (if delegates so choose) military cooperation.

The Summit's final institutional product may take any form the room can agree on: a loose consultative body meeting periodically; a fully chartered organisation with a standing secretariat, courts, and funds; a narrower religious-diplomatic body focused solely on the custodianship of holy sites; a defence pact; an economic community; or some hybrid no existing organisation has yet attempted. No outcome is pre-ordained. The chapters that follow exist to give you the widest possible menu of ingredients — it is your job to decide what, if anything, to cook.

4. Delegation Roster

Thirty heads of state and government are seated at this Summit, drawn from every corner of the Muslim world — from the Atlantic shore of Mauritania to the archipelagos of Indonesia, from the Bosphorus to the Horn of Africa. Each delegate below is a member of this Council with full standing, full voice, and a full vote in whatever this body ultimately decides to build.

Head of State / Government	Country / Delegation
King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud	Saudi Arabia
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto	Pakistan

Anwar Sadat	Egypt
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi	Libya
Hafez al-Assad	Syria
Süleyman Demirel	Turkey
Yasser Arafat	Palestine / PLO
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman	Bangladesh (East Pakistan)
King Hussein I	Jordan
Houari Boumédiène	Algeria
Tun Abdul Razak	Malaysia
Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan	Abu Dhabi / Trucial States
King Hassan II	Morocco
Habib Bourguiba	Tunisia
Jaafar Nimeiry	Sudan
Suharto	Indonesia
Qaboos bin Said	Oman
Tunku Abdul Rahman	Malaysia (Senior Statesman)
Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa	Bahrain
Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani	Qatar
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi	Iran
Sheikh Sabah III Al-Salim Al-Sabah	Kuwait
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr	Iraq
Mohamed Siad Barre	Somalia
Mohammad Zahir Shah	Afghanistan
Moktar Ould Daddah	Mauritania
Hamani Diori	Niger
Ahmed Sékou Touré	Guinea
Abdul Rahman al-Iryani	Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)
Moussa Traoré	Mali

Table 1. Full ESIW roster of thirty member delegations, in order of seating. Titles reflect each leader's office as of the Summit.

5. Pathways to Unity: Models the Ummah Has Already Built

Before reaching for entirely new institutional inventions, delegates should reckon honestly with the organisations Muslim and Arab states have already built — what each achieved, and precisely where each fell short. A credible new institution will need to learn from these failures as much as from their successes.

5.1 The Arab League (est. 1945)

The oldest and most institutionally developed regional body available to this Summit's Arab delegations. Headquartered in Cairo, the League operates on unanimous or near-unanimous consent, has coordinated diplomatic positions on Palestine for over two decades, and maintains a permanent secretariat and a Council of Foreign Ministers. Its structural weakness is precisely its strength: because it requires broad consensus and respects the absolute sovereignty of every member, it has proven very good at issuing joint statements and very poor at compelling any member state to actually act, fund, or fight in concert. It is also, by design, exclusively Arab — leaving Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, and every non-Arab delegation in this room permanently outside it.

5.2 The Non-Aligned Movement (est. 1961)

Born at Belgrade from the Bandung spirit, NAM unites postcolonial states around a shared refusal to be conscripted into either Cold War bloc. Several leaders in this room — Nasser's Egypt among the founders, alongside Indonesia and others — have invested real prestige in it. NAM demonstrates that a genuinely global, religiously and ideologically diverse coalition can hold together around a narrow, disciplined idea (non-alignment). It offers almost no template, however, for economic integration, collective defence, or the custodianship of specific shared religious or cultural sites — its ambitions are deliberately minimal.

5.3 The Organisation of African Unity (est. 1963)

Founded in Addis Ababa, the OAU binds together nearly every African state — Muslim-majority and not — around the sanctity of colonial-era borders and non-interference in domestic affairs. Several African delegations in this room (Somalia, Mauritania, Niger, Guinea, Mali, Sudan) are also OAU members, and will resist any Islamic body whose obligations conflict with their OAU commitments, particularly the OAU's near-absolute rule against redrawing borders — a rule Somalia, notably, chafes against.

5.4 The Baghdad Pact and CENTO: A Cautionary Tale

The Baghdad Pact, a 1955 mutual-defence treaty binding Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom (reorganised as CENTO, the Central Treaty Organisation, after Iraq's 1958 revolution pulled it out), stands as the clearest historical example of a formal Muslim-majority military alliance — and a clear warning. Nasser denounced it viciously as a colonial trojan horse designed to divide the Arab world and tie Muslim states to Western strategic interests, and the Pact never achieved the legitimacy or unity its architects hoped for. Any defence arrangement proposed at this Summit will be measured against this precedent: is it a genuine expression of Muslim solidarity, or an updated version of the same great-power alignment dressed in new clothes?

5.5 The Muslim World League (est. 1962)

Discussed above in Section 2.1 — the League proves that Muslim states can build durable religious-charitable institutions together. It is deliberately apolitical and non-binding, which is exactly why it survived the Arab Cold War intact while other proposals collapsed. Its model — soft power, religious legitimacy, no compulsory obligations on member states — is worth studying closely as a low-risk template, even if it may prove too weak, by itself, to guarantee the security of holy sites.

6. Case Study: A Continental Experiment in the West

Every delegation in this room has an intelligence service, and every intelligence service has, over the past decade, filed reports on an unusual and ambitious experiment unfolding among a cluster of Western European states — old rivals who fought two catastrophic wars against one another in living memory, now engaged in the deliberate, treaty-by-treaty construction of a shared political, economic, monetary, and security house. What follows is the fullest reconstruction of that experiment's architecture available to this Summit — every pillar, every institution, every mechanism, and every benefit its own architects claim for it, laid out in exhaustive detail, purely as raw material. Nothing in this section is a recommendation. Delegates are free to borrow any piece of it wholesale, adapt it beyond recognition, combine it with the older Islamic and Arab models surveyed in Section 5, or reject it outright as unsuited — for reasons of theology, sovereignty, geography, or plain political reality — to the ummah's situation. But no delegate should leave this Summit unfamiliar with any piece of it.

6.1 Origins: Pooling the Instruments of War

The project began narrowly and deliberately. In the early 1950s, several Western European states agreed to place their coal and steel production — at the time, the literal raw material of war — under a single shared authority, reasoning that states which pooled the instruments of warfare could no longer easily wage war against one another. It was, in effect, disarmament disguised as an industrial cartel. From that narrow beginning, the project expanded steadily, treaty by treaty, decade by decade, into something far larger: a common market, a shared legal order, and eventually a genuine claim to shared sovereignty in specific domains.

A Delegate's Note — Observe the method as much as the outcome: the architects of this project did not attempt full political union on day one. They began with the single narrowest form of cooperation their members could stomach — pooling two industrial commodities — built trust and habit through it, and only later layered on more ambitious pillars. This gradualist, functionalist method (sometimes called 'spillover': cooperation in one narrow domain creates pressure and trust that spills into the next) may itself be more exportable to the ummah than any specific institution it produced.

6.2 The Common Market Pillar

At the economic core of the project sits a customs union and common market: internal tariffs between member states are abolished entirely, while a single common external tariff is applied uniformly to goods entering from outside the bloc. Beyond tariffs, the members are steadily dismantling non-tariff barriers as well, working toward what is described as 'four freedoms' — the free movement of goods, capital, services,

and, most radically, labour, meaning a worker from one member state may, in principle, live and work in another without a visa or work permit.

- A common external tariff wall, negotiated as a bloc rather than state-by-state, giving member states collective bargaining leverage in trade talks with much larger economies (the United States, the Soviet bloc) that no single member could match alone.
- Harmonised technical standards and product regulations, so that goods manufactured to one member's specifications are automatically accepted in every other member's markets, without re-certification or re-testing at each border.
- Mutual recognition of professional qualifications and diplomas, so a doctor, engineer, or lawyer licensed in one member state may practise in another without repeating years of local certification.
- A shared competition (anti-monopoly) policy, empowering a joint authority to block mergers, cartels, and state subsidies that would let a firm in one member state unfairly crush competitors in another — policing the internal market the way a national government would police its own.
- A Common Agricultural Policy: heavily subsidised, price-supported farm production, funded jointly, intended to guarantee food security across the bloc and to placate politically powerful rural constituencies in every member state.
- Emerging structural and cohesion funds: jointly financed transfers of capital from the bloc's wealthier, more industrialised members toward its poorer, more agrarian ones — explicitly designed to narrow the development gap between members rather than let market forces alone decide who prospers.
- A single external voice in global trade negotiations — the bloc negotiates tariff and trade agreements with outside powers collectively, through one delegation, rather than each member bargaining alone and being picked off one at a time by a larger counterpart.

6.3 The Monetary Pillar: A Single Shared Currency

The most ambitious pillar under active discussion among the bloc's finance ministries, even now in 1969, is full monetary union: the eventual replacement of every member state's national currency with one single shared currency, managed not by any individual national government but by a jointly owned central bank answerable to the bloc as a whole. The stated logic is threefold. First, fluctuating exchange rates between members are themselves a hidden tariff — a tax on trade and investment that a single currency would eliminate outright, along with every cost of converting money at a border. Second, a shared currency insulates smaller, weaker economies from speculative attacks on their national money that a large economy could shrug off but a small one cannot. Third, and most ambitiously, a currency shared by an entire continent would carry monetary weight to rival the American dollar itself on the world stage — a lever of influence no single member's currency could ever achieve alone.

- A jointly owned central bank, independent of any single member government, empowered to set interest rates and control the money supply for the whole currency area.
- A fixed framework binding member currencies to one another as a transitional step, narrowing the band in which they are allowed to fluctuate against each other before full union arrives, so that businesses and investors can plan with confidence years in advance.

- A single set of banknotes and coinage, replacing dozens of separate national currencies, symbols, and central banks with one, and eliminating currency-exchange fees on every transaction that currently crosses an internal border.

The political cost is severe, and delegates should weigh it soberly: a state that adopts a shared currency permanently surrenders the power to devalue its own money to boost exports, to set its own interest rates to cool or heat its own economy, or to print its way out of a domestic fiscal crisis. It is, arguably, the single largest peacetime concession of economic sovereignty any state can make.

6.4 The Security Pillar: A Joint Shield and a Joint Army

Parallel to, and initially predating, the economic project, several of the same states have separately bound themselves into a mutual security compact: an attack on any one member is treated, by treaty, as an attack on all, triggering an automatic obligation of collective military response — the clearest possible signal to any outside aggressor that no member stands alone.

- A binding mutual-defence clause: an armed attack on one member obliges every other member to render assistance, by whatever means each judges necessary, up to and including armed force.
- A standing council of defence ministers and joint military staff, meeting regularly to coordinate strategy, share intelligence, and plan joint responses to shared threats — rather than each state's generals planning in isolation.
- Standardised weapons, ammunition calibres, and equipment across member armies, so that units from different states can resupply one another in the field and fight side by side without logistical chaos.
- Joint weapons procurement and joint defence-industrial projects, pooling research budgets so member states can develop advanced aircraft, armour, and weapons systems together that none could afford to build alone.
- Regular joint military exercises across member territories, building genuine operational familiarity between armies that were, within living memory, fighting one another.
- A more ambitious, still-unrealised proposal circulating among the bloc's defence planners: a genuinely merged multinational army — mixed-nationality units answering to a single shared command structure rather than to separate national general staffs — effectively dissolving the very idea of a purely national military force.

Even short of a fully merged army, the practical effect of the standing consultative apparatus is to make member states' armed forces function as extensions of one another rather than as separate, potentially rival, national instruments — a level of military trust with no real precedent among fully sovereign states.

6.5 The Political & Legal Pillars

Governance of the whole structure rests on several interlocking bodies, each solving a different problem of collective decision-making, and together forming a genuine layer of government above the level of the individual nation-state:

- A Council of Heads of State or Government — the supreme political authority, meeting periodically to set overall direction, break deadlocks, and resolve disputes the lower bodies cannot.
- A rotating chairmanship or presidency, passed between member states on a fixed schedule (commonly six months to a year), ensuring no single member permanently dominates the chair and giving even the smallest member a scheduled turn at setting the agenda and hosting the bloc's summits.
- A permanent executive Commission-like body, staffed by appointed (not directly elected) officials drawn from every member state, empowered to propose common policy, administer joint funds, negotiate on the bloc's behalf, and enforce agreed rules even against the wishes of an individual member state — the clearest expression of pooled, rather than merely coordinated, sovereignty.
- A consultative Assembly or Parliament, gradually accumulating real budgetary and oversight powers over time, intended to give the project a democratic face beyond simple deals struck privately between governments.
- A Court of Justice, whose rulings on disputes between members, or between a member and the bloc's own institutions, are treated as binding and supreme — a genuinely supranational judicial authority whose interpretation of shared law can overrule a national government's own courts on matters within its jurisdiction.
- A Court of Auditors, independent of both the Commission-like executive and the member governments, whose sole job is to examine how the bloc's pooled budget is actually spent and to publish findings of waste, fraud, or mismanagement.
- An Ombudsman's office, allowing any citizen of any member state to lodge a formal complaint against the bloc's own institutions — a check on the new supranational bureaucracy answering directly to individuals rather than only to governments.
- A settled principle that shared law, once agreed, takes precedence over any conflicting national law — and a companion principle of subsidiarity, under which decisions are pushed down to the most local level capable of handling them, so the centre only governs what genuinely needs to be governed collectively.
- A treaty-amendment process requiring unanimous ratification by every member state's own parliament before any change to the founding rules takes effect — ensuring no member can be bound to a deeper commitment than its own people, through their own institutions, have explicitly accepted.
- A distinction, carefully negotiated clause by clause, between matters requiring unanimous agreement of every member (treaty changes, new members, the most sensitive questions of sovereignty) and matters that can be decided by a qualified majority vote (routine market regulation), so the bloc is not permanently paralysed by a single objector on every question.

6.6 Financing the Whole Structure

None of the above functions without money, and the bloc has settled on a system of 'own resources' rather than relying on voluntary, ad-hoc contributions that member states could withhold whenever politically convenient:

- A fixed share of the customs duties collected at the bloc's external border, paid directly into the shared budget rather than kept by the state where the goods happened to land.
- A small agreed percentage of a harmonised sales-tax base collected by each member, likewise paid into the shared budget.
- A supplementary contribution from each member scaled to the size of its overall economy, ensuring larger, wealthier members bear a proportionally larger share of the bloc's costs.
- A multi-year financial framework, agreed in advance by every member, that fixes overall spending levels and priorities for several years at a time — removing the annual budget from being re-fought as a political crisis every single year.

6.7 Free Movement, a Common Passport, and a Shared Identity

Citizens of member states increasingly cross internal borders without passport checks at all, may in principle settle, work, and eventually gain full civic and social-security rights in any member state, and are beginning to be issued travel documents in a common format and colour, instantly recognisable across the bloc even though each still bears its holder's own national name.

- A common-format passport, nationally issued but uniform in design, signalling bloc membership to any border official anywhere in the world.
- A long-term ambition of a passport-free internal travel area, in which crossing from one member state to another becomes no different, in practice, from crossing a provincial boundary inside a single country.
- Coordinated social-security and pension arrangements for citizens who work in one member state and retire in another, so that decades of contributions are not lost simply for having crossed an internal border.
- A common flag, flown alongside (never in place of) each member's own national flag, and active discussion of a common anthem and a shared commemorative 'founding day' — symbols intended to build a felt sense of shared belonging that sits alongside, rather than replaces, each citizen's national identity.
- Early cultural and educational exchange programmes, sending students and scholars to study in one another's universities, intended to raise a new generation that thinks of itself as bound to its neighbours as much as to its own state.

6.8 A Common External Voice

Beyond trade, the bloc's members increasingly consult one another before major foreign-policy decisions, aiming — not always successfully — to speak with one voice on the world stage rather than as a dozen separate and sometimes contradictory governments. This extends to jointly administered development-aid programmes toward former colonial territories, coordinated positions in global forums, and, on the bloc's furthest political horizon, discussion of shared embassies representing the whole bloc's interests in third countries where a full individual national presence would be redundant.

6.9 Admission of New Members

The bloc is not static, and its accession process is itself a piece of engineering worth studying. A candidate state must meet a defined set of conditions — stable governance, a functioning market economy, and a binding commitment to accept the entire existing body of shared rules and treaties exactly as agreed by current members, with no picking and choosing — and admission requires the unanimous consent of every existing member. This protects the depth of what current members have already built: a new member joins the whole structure as it stands, rather than diluting it or re-opening settled questions the moment it arrives.

6.10 Questions for This Summit to Weigh

Delegates should read the preceding pillars not as a blueprint to copy but as a menu of hard trade-offs to interrogate:

- The Western project rests on a shared, narrow geography and comparable levels of industrial development among its earliest members. The ummah spans deserts, archipelagos, and mountain ranges, and includes both some of the wealthiest states on earth and some of the poorest. Does economic union make sense before economic convergence, or must convergence come first?
- The Western project's security pillar answers to a single, obvious external threat its members agree on. Does the ummah agree, as clearly, on what — or whom — a joint Islamic shield would be defending against?
- Pooled sovereignty required these Western states to accept binding rulings from a shared court and a shared executive body. Every monarchy and every revolutionary republic in this room has its own reasons to guard sovereignty jealously. Is any degree of pooled sovereignty realistic here — or is a looser, consultative model (closer to the Muslim World League or the Non-Aligned Movement) the ummah's actual ceiling?
- A single shared currency demands extraordinary fiscal trust between members. Given the region's wide disparities — oil wealth in the Gulf, subsistence agriculture in the Sahel — would a common development fund (redistributive, but short of a shared currency) capture most of the benefit at a fraction of the political cost?
- The Western bloc built its shared identity on top of, not instead of, national identity. Could a common Islamic identity — already latent in shared faith, shared law traditions, and now shared grievance — do the same work with far less institutional machinery than currency or defence union would require?

7. Key Questions for Delegates (QARMAs)

Questions A Resolution (or Communiqué, or Charter) Must Answer. Delegates should be prepared to take, defend, and negotiate positions on each of the following:

- Should this Summit establish a permanent standing organisation at all, or issue a one-time declaration and disperse? If permanent, what should it be called, and where should it be headquartered?

- What is the organisation's core mandate — religious and custodial (protecting Jerusalem and other holy sites), political and diplomatic (coordinating foreign policy, especially on Palestine), economic (a common market, a development fund), military (a mutual defence pact), or some combination?
- What is the mechanism for admitting new members, and is membership open only to Muslim-majority states, or also to states with significant Muslim minorities?
- How are decisions made — unanimous consent (as in the Arab League), majority or supermajority voting, or a hybrid where some matters require consensus and others do not?
- Is any portion of sovereignty pooled or ceded to a shared institution (a court, a commission, a shared fund with binding disbursement rules), or does the new body remain purely consultative and non-binding?
- How is the organisation financed — equal contributions regardless of wealth, contributions scaled to GDP or oil revenue, or a voluntary fund?
- Does the organisation take a position on, or actively intervene in, disputes between its own members (Iraq–Kuwait tensions, the still-fresh Yemeni civil war, Somalia's regional ambitions), or does it strictly confine itself to disputes with non-member states?
- What is the organisation's relationship to existing bodies — does it complement or compete with the Arab League, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the OAU? How are overlapping obligations resolved when they conflict?
- What is the organisation's posture toward the two Cold War superpowers — strict non-alignment, or pragmatic engagement with whichever bloc offers the better terms on a given issue?
- Does the organisation pursue economic integration (tariff reduction, a common fund, eventually a common currency), and if so, on what timeline, and with what safeguards for its poorest members?
- Does the organisation include any collective security or mutual defence obligation, and if so, how explicitly is it defined, and against what threats?
- What immediate, concrete action does this Summit take in response to the al-Aqsa fire itself — a joint diplomatic protest, a fund for the mosque's restoration, a permanent committee on Jerusalem, or something firmer?

8. Closing Note & Further Preparation

This guide is a starting point, not a ceiling. Delegates are strongly encouraged to research their assigned leader's actual public statements, alliances, rivalries, and domestic pressures circa 1969, and to arrive with a clear, defensible theory of what their state wants from this Summit — and what it is and is not willing to trade to get it.

A few areas worth independent research before the first session:

- Your leader's actual relationship with the two Cold War superpowers, and any formal defence or aid agreements already in place.

- Your state's specific stake in the Palestine question — border state, distant sympathiser, or host to a large Palestinian refugee population.
- Any live disputes with neighbouring states in this room (border disputes, ideological rivalries, competing claims) that could complicate cooperation.
- Your state's economic profile in 1969 — oil wealth, agricultural base, industrial development — and what it would gain or lose from tariff reduction, a shared fund, or a shared currency.

“Ta’awanu ‘ala al-birri wa al-taqwa — cooperate in righteousness and piety.”

We look forward to the arguments, alliances, and architecture you bring to Rabat. Good luck, and welcome to the Summit.



— END OF STUDY GUIDE —